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Munda v. Summerlin Life & Health Ins. Co., 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 83 
(Dec. 29, 2011)1 
TORTS — FEDERAL STATUTORY PREEMPTION 
 
Summary 
 
 An appeal from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss in a tort action. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The Court concluded that state law claims of negligence and negligence per se may not 
always be preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)2 if the claims 
are based on actions while administering a managed care organization (MCO), separable from 
administering an ERISA plan.  Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded because the 
appellants alleged a set of facts that could entitle them to relief if the respondent operated as an 
MCO administrator, and not an ERISA plan administrator. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Respondent Summerlin is an insurer/MCO that contracts with medical providers to 
provide healthcare services. Summerlin contracted with the Endoscopy Center of Southern 
Nevada and the Gastroenterology Center of Nevada (collectively, “the Clinic”) to provide 
healthcare services. Appellants Janise and Gibb Munda (collectively, “Mundas”) alleged that 
from at least 2002, Summerlin encouraged its insureds to seek treatment from the Clinic. 
Between March 2004 and February 2008, the Clinic engaged in a number of unsafe medical 
practices that were ultimately discovered in early 2008 through an investigation conducted by the 
Southern Nevada Health District and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Summerlin 
subsequently terminated its contract with the Clinic based on the investigation. 
 
 Summerlin insured Janise Munda through her employer's health plan, which was 
governed by ERISA. She sought treatment at the Clinic on February 16, 2007, and March 2, 
2007, because it was a Summerlin provider. Janise was later diagnosed with hepatitis C, which 
the Health District determined she contracted as a result of being treated at the Clinic. The 
Mundas sued Summerlin for failure to comply with quality assurance standards, alleging 
negligence, negligence per se, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing/bad 
faith, and loss of consortium. The Mundas further alleged that Summerlin failed to evaluate, 
audit, monitor, and supervise its healthcare providers as required by NRS 695G.180(1).3 
 
The Mundas' based their claims on Summerlin's role as an MCO, not as an administrator 
of an ERISA plan. Summerlin filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that ERISA preempted the 
ourt granted Summerlin's motion pursuant to ERISA and NRCP Mundas' claims. The district c
                                                        
1 By Joseph Bowen 
2 ERISA's preemption provisions 502(a) and 514(a) are codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a) and 1144(a). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. 695G.180(1) provides in part that "[e]ach managed care organization shall establish a quality 
assurance program designed to direct, evaluate and monitor the effectiveness of health care services provided to its 
insureds." 
12(b)(5). This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Writing for a unanimous en banc court4, Justice Douglas reversed the district court’s 
grant of Summerlin’s motion to dismiss based on the ERISA preemption statutes because it was 
not beyond a doubt that the Mundas '''could prove no set of facts ... [that] would entitle [them] to 
relief.'"5 
 
In determining whether ERISA preempted the Mundas’ claims, the Court first looked to 
the intent of Congress. The Court noted that Congress enacted ERISA to protect the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries. Additionally, to ensure that 
employee benefit plan regulation remains exclusively a federal concern, ERISA has expansive 
preemption provisions. However, the United States Supreme Court determined there is "a 
presumption against holding that ERISA preempts state or local laws regulating matters that fall 
within the traditional police powers of the State."6 Traditionally, such powers include the 
regulation of health and safety matters.7  
 
 Next, the Court turned its attention to whether ERISA preempts NRS Chapter 695G. 
ERISA 514(a) expressly preempts all state laws that “relate to” any employee benefit plan. 8 A 
law “relates to” a covered employee benefit plan if it has a “reference to” or “connection with” 
it.9  The Court determined that the "reference to" prong does not preempt NRS 695G.180 
because NRS Chapter 695G's quality assurance requirements apply to all MCOs, regardless of 
their ERISA status or relationship with any ERISA plan.10  
 
To determine whether a state law has a “connection with” a covered employee benefit 
plan, courts consider whether the state law: (1) regulates the types of benefits of ERISA 
employee welfare benefits plans; (2) requires the establishment of a separate employee benefit 
plan to comply with the law; (3) imposes reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements 
for ERISA plans; and (4) regulates certain ERISA relationships, including the relationships 
between an ERISA plan and employer and, to the extent an employee benefit plan is involved, 
between the employer and employee.11  
 
The Court noted that when the conduct at issue is not performed in the capacity of the 
ERISA plan, plan administrator, or plan agent, it is not preempted by ERISA section 514(a) 
because the relationship with the ERISA plan is too tangential. While NRS Chapter 695G may 
n elects to purchase an insurance plan or lease access to a provider affect an ERISA plan if the pla
                                                        
4 Justice Pickering voluntarily recused herself from participation in the decision of this matter. 
5 Vacation Village v. Hitachi America, 110 Nev. 481, 484, 874 P.2d 744, 746 (1994) (quoting Edgar v. Wagner, 101 
Nev. 226, 228, 699 P.2d 110, 112 (1985).  
6 Golden Gate Rest. v. City & County of S.F., 512 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008). 
7 De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Service Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997). 
8 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) 
9 Ca. Div. of Labor v. Dillingham Constr. N.A. Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997). 
10 Cervantes v. Health Plan of Nev., 127 Nev. __, __, __ P.3d .__, __ (Adv. Op. No. 70, October 27, 2011).  
11 Insco v. Aetna Health & Life Ins. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1187 (D. Nev. 2009) (quoting Oper. Eng. Health & 
Welfare v. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 1998). 
network from an MCO, these would only be indirect economic effects.  Furthermore, because 
NRS Chapter 695G does not bind an ERISA plan to any particular choice, section 514(a)'s 
preemptive effect is not triggered.  In this situation, NRS Chapter 695G only affects an ERISA 
plan to the extent that it voluntarily chooses to utilize the products of an MCO that is regulated 
by the statute. Thus, NRS Chapter 695G does not have a “connection with” an ERISA plan 
under the set of facts alleged before it. 
 
In the instant case, the Mundas alleged facts to support a finding that preemption does not 
apply, specifically, that Summerlin, who was acting as an MCO instead of an ERISA plan 
administrator, insured them. Because ERISA section 514(a) does not preempt claims brought 
against Summerlin in its capacity as an MCO, there was a question as to whether Summerlin's 
selection and retention choices regarding the Clinic were made in conjunction with its status as 
an MCO or its status as the ERISA plan administrator. Since there was no automatic preemption 
under the set of facts alleged before it, it did not appear beyond a doubt that the Mundas could 
not prove a set of facts that would entitle them to relief, and the allegations were legally 
sufficient to constitute the elements of the claims asserted, the Court reversed the district court’s 
order. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Although it provided insurance coverage through an employee/employer benefit plan, 
ERISA may not automatically preempt claims against Summerlin in its capacity as an MCO. In 
the case at bar, the state law claims for negligence should have survived a motion to dismiss 
because the Mundas alleged sufficient facts to support the finding that Summerlin acted as an 
MCO, and not an ERISA plan administrator. 
